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Abstract
We propose a general parametrizable model to capture the dynamic interaction among bacteria in
the formation of micro-colonies. micro-colonies represent the first social step towards the formation
of structured multicellular communities known as bacterial biofilms, which protect the bacteria against
antimicrobials. In our model, bacteria can form links in the form of intercellular adhesins (such as
polysaccharides) to collaborate in the production of resources that are fundamental to protect them
against antimicrobials. Since maintaining a link can be costly, we assume that each bacterium forms
and maintains a link only if the benefit received from the link is larger than the cost, and we formalize
the interaction among bacteria as a dynamic network formation game. We rigorously characterize some
of the key properties of the network evolution depending on the parameters of the system. In particular,
we derive the parameters under which it is guaranteed that all bacteria will join micro-colonies and the
parameters under which it is guaranteed that some bacteria will not join micro-colonies. Importantly, our
study does not only characterize the properties of networks emerging in equilibrium, but it also provides
important insights on how the network dynamically evolves and on how the formation history impacts
the emerging networks in equilibrium. This analysis can be used to develop methods to influence on-
the-fly the evolution of the network, and such methods can be useful to treat or prevent biofilm-related
diseases.
Index Terms
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Bacteria have a tendency to attach to surfaces and self-organize into micro-colonies, which rep-
resent the first step toward the formation of biofilms. Biofilms are surface associated communities
that are encased within an extracellular matrix, which can function as a structural scaffold and
as a protective barrier to antimicrobials [1], [2]. In fact, biofilm communities exhibit enhanced
antibiotic tolerance and biofilm infections are notoriously difficult to treat [2]–[4].
Key components of the biofilm extracellular matrix are the exopolysaccharides , which are
responsible for a wide range of functions involving cell-to-surface and cell-to-cell interactions
[1], and can impart resistance to antibiotics [5]. Our prior study [6], however, has shown that
some specific types of exopolysaccharides play also an active roles in the early stage organization
of micro-colonies and biofilms. A phenomenological model of the exopolysaccharides impact
on the dynamics of micro-colonies and biofilm development, one using simple assumptions and
well-controlled approximations, would provide crucial guidance to our understanding of biofilms
and the design of biofilm therapeutic strategies.
In this work, we focus on the implications of having the simplest type of adhesion molecule
between bacteria, a cell-to-cell adhesin that forms a linkage between two cells. We propose a
general parametrizable model, built based on experimental evidence obtained from various studies
including our own prior works [5], [6], to capture the dynamic interaction among bacteria in the
formation of micro-colonies. In our model, bacteria move along a surface and produce resources
(a generalized model for inter-cell adhesions, like polysaccharides), which spread in space to an
extent that we can control in the model, and give a benefit to all bacteria which get access to
them. When two bacteria approach each other, in order to benefit from the resources produced
by the other, each of them can decide to stop moving. We call this process “link” formation and
we state that a link is maintained between two bacteria if they remain close. Bacteria can also
link with bacteria that are already linked to other bacteria, as well as can break existing links.
To develop a general model, we abstract in this paper from the mobility and motility models
of bacteria (which depend on the particular strain of bacteria), and from the geometric properties
of the surface and the positions of bacteria, and we assume that the meetings among bacteria
are governed by a random process, like in [7]. We consider a discrete time model and assume
that in each time slot each bacterium can break some of its links, and a non-linked (singleton)
3bacterium is matched with a certain probability with another (linked or non-linked) bacterium
and they decide whether to form a link. Since in our prior study we observed that areas rich of
resources act as a signaling mechanism that attracts bacteria toward them [6], we assume that
the probability of being matched with a bacterium that has high connectivity (many links), and
hence it is located in an area rich of resources, is higher than the probability of being matched
with a bacterium that has low connectivity.
We consider a population including bacteria in two different physiological states, which we
refer to as types. High type bacteria increase their resource production rate when linked to other
bacteria, for example [6] shows that the resource production rates of some bacteria increase when
they are located in areas rich of resources. Low type bacteria are considered to have constant
resource production rate regardless of their links [6]. Moreover, we make the assumption that
bacteria are selfish and myopic [8], i.e., they choose whether to form or break a link such that
they maximize their immediate utilities.
We will study two limiting cases. In the case of complete information bacteria know in advance
the immediate utilities they will obtain by forming links with other specific bacteria. In the case
of incomplete information bacteria know the utilities associated to a link only after they have
formed it. In the context of microbiology, if bacteria have a long time to sample the environment
and integrate inputs (which corresponds to slow motility compared to gene expression and protein
synthesis response times), or if the environmental conditions are slowly-varying in time, then
bacteria are well-described by the first limit. In contrast, if bacteria move quickly relative to
their response times or if the environmental conditions vary significantly in time, then the latter
limit would be more appropriate. For example, something as simple as nutritional conditions can
impact motility and biochemical signaling [9].
As a main contribution of this work, we characterize the possible evolutions of the micro-
colonies formed by bacteria depending on the system parameters. In particular, we define a stable
network as a network in which all bacteria belong to some micro-colonies, and we analytically
derive the conditions on the system parameters, in both complete and incomplete information
settings, under which a stable network emerges, under which a stable network does not emerge,
and under which the emergence of a stable network is determined by chance.
The types of behavior predicted by our model are observed in real-world experiments. For
example, Fig. 1 shows the variation of the communities formed by Pseudomonas aeruginosa – a
4Fig. 1: Variation of Pseudomonas aeruginosa communities under different conditions: a) small micro-colonies formed
by wild types, b) large micro-colonies formed by mutants that overproduce polysaccharide Psl, c) no micro-colonies
formed by mutants that cannot produce Psl.
bacterium widely used in biofilm research [4]–[6] – under different conditions. Each of the three
images is a snapshot of the bacterial movement on a 67 × 67µm glass surface. Each snapshot
is taken with an Olympus microscope when the total number of bacterial visits on the surface
reaches 1.5 × 106. For this experiment we use the wild type Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain
PAO1 (Fig. 1.a), and its isogenic mutants ∆Ppsl/PBAD − psl (Fig. 1.b) and ∆pslD (Fig.
1.c). The mutant ∆Ppsl/PBAD − psl with 1% arabinose added into the medium produces
larger amounts of polysaccharide Psl than the wild type strain PAO1, whereas the mutant
∆pslD cannot produce Psl. Fig. 1 shows that large micro-colonies are formed by mutants that
overproduce Psl; instead, no micro-colonies are formed by mutants that cannot produce Psl.
The results presented in this manuscript represent an important step toward the derivation
of bacterial behavior models, which can help us answer several enabling questions such as:
How do combinations of motility, polysaccharide production, and antibiotics influence bacterial
decisions to form micro-colonies and eventually biofilms that are inherently more tolerant to
antibiotics? Present strategies to treat biofilm-related diseases are based solely on killing bacteria,
which result in a large selection pressure to evolve drug-resistant strains. Conversely, a dynamic
model of network formation and micro-colony development allows to foresee how a bacterial
community responds to a complex set of stimuli, and whether bacterial community decisions
can be influenced. Since our model is dynamic and incorporates tunable parameters, it allows
for specific microbiological experiments to be designed. Moreover, our general model can be
calibrated for various strains of bacteria and types of linkage-generating adhesions, such as
polysaccharides. Finding the inputs that will disassemble a micro-colony in a controlled manner
will have a transformative impact on biofilm therapeutics.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature in nano-
scale communications and network formation. Section III describes our model and introduces the
basic concepts necessary to study how micro-colonies form. Section IV formalizes the interaction
of the bacteria as a dynamic network formation game. Section V analyzes the dynamic network
formation game. Section VI presents several illustrative results aimed to understand the essential
characteristics of micro-colonies formation and their dependence on the key parameters of the
system. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Molecular communication
Molecular communication [10] is a nanoscale communication paradigm that has emerged
recently, that enables engineered biological nanomachines to exchange information with the
natural biological nanomachines which form a biological system. Distinct from the current
telecommunication paradigm, molecular communication uses molecules as the carriers of in-
formation. Many works propose and study models for molecular communication [10]–[15]. For
example, [11] proposes a model for the reception noise, [10] studies some approaches to reduce
the noise, [12]–[14] investigate the channel capacity and achievable rates, and [15] proposes a
synchronization-free molecular communication scheme.
Our work is clearly different from this literature because it does not focus on methods to
enable the exchange of information among static nanomachines. Our research focuses on deriving
network formation game models to analyze the dynamic formation of micro-colonies of bacteria.
B. Network Science
There is a renowned literature that first studies network formation as the result of strategic
interaction among a group of self-interested agents [7], [16]–[18]. In these papers, it is common
to assume agent homogeneity. This is the strongest form of complete information, in the sense
that agents do not only know their exact utilities from linking to others, but are also aware that
the utilities are solely determined by the network topology, and that the agents’ identities have no
role in affecting utility characteristics. We differ from these works because in our paper bacteria
are heterogeneous in utilities they provide to and receive from others, and they are myopic, i.e.,
they only care about their immediate utility when making decisions.
6In the network formation literature that considers agent heterogeneity, the concept “heterogene-
ity” is interpreted from various angles: as differentiated failure probabilities for different links
[19], as differences in values obtained from links and costs for forming links across agents [20],
[21], as different amounts of valuable information produced endogenously [22], [23], as different
endogenous effort levels [24], or as agent-specific resource holding amounts [25]. Despite such
heterogeneity, these works assume complete information, i.e., that agents know their exact utilities
from linking to others. We differ from these works because in our paper bacteria are myopic
and we analyze also the incomplete information setting, in which a bacterium does not know
the type of a bacterium it meets and whether this bacterium is connected to other bacteria.
Importantly, most of the above cited works study the properties of a network after it has
achieved a stable point, but they do not analyze if and, possibly, how the network becomes stable.
A key merit of our work, as opposed to the above literature, is that we study the dynamic evolution
of the network, which has two fundamental advantages. First, we are able to predict under which
conditions a stable network does, does not, or may emerge. Second, the understanding of the
network evolution process allows to develop methods to influence on-the-fly the evolution of the
network, and such methods can be useful to treat or prevent biofilm-related diseases.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a population of bacteria that are distributed on a surface. We denote by K the
number of bacteria in the surface and by K = {1, . . . , K} the set of bacteria. In our model,
bacteria move along the surface, produce resources, and form new links or break existing links
with other bacteria. The resources produced by the bacteria are secreted polysaccharides. At
present, our understanding of the chemical nature of these polysaccharides, and therefore the
wetting properties of such polysaccharides on surfaces, is incomplete. To have the most general
possible model, we assume that part of the resource is adhered to the cell body [5], and part of
it wets the surface via spreading. In Subsection IV-A we will introduce a tunable parameter, the
spread factor δ, to fit the properties of specific polysaccharides once their physical properties
are known.
We say that there is a link between two bacteria i and j if their distance is below a certain
threshold and they intentionally decide not to move and maintain such a distance. The images
in [5] suggest that such distance threshold is about 0.3 microns, i.e., 1
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the size of a typical
7cell.1 A link is formed and maintained bilaterally, i.e., both bacteria must agree to form and
maintain the links. Indeed, if a bacterium does not want to maintain a link it can leave that
specific location and break the link. Moreover, a link is undirected, because a link between i
and j automatically implies a link between j and i. If two bacteria are linked, because of their
proximity, each of them can exploit part of the resources produced but not used by the other
bacterium, i.e., two bacteria have a mutual benefit to stay close to each other.
We consider a population including bacteria in two different physiological states, which we
refer to as types. Different types of bacteria differ in the resource production rate they adopt when
they are linked with other bacteria: high type bacteria (H) increase their resource production
rate when linked to other bacteria, whereas low type bacteria (L) are considered to have constant
resource production rate regardless of their links [6]. We denote by K(L) and K(H) = K−K(L)
the number of low and high type bacteria, respectively, and by ρL , K(L)K and ρH ,
K(H)
K
the
ratio of low and high type bacteria, respectively. Also, we denote by ti ∈ {L,H} the type of
bacterium i, i ∈ K, and by t = (t1, . . . , tK) the type profile.
In this paper, we divide the time into equal slots and we characterize the history of interactions
among bacteria and its influence on the formation of micro-colonies. We write g(n)ij = 1 if bacteria
i and j are linked at the beginning of time slot n, and g(n)ij = 0 otherwise. We formally define
the network G(n) as the set of all bacteria that are linked at the beginning of the n-th time slot,
G(n) , {(i, j) : g(n)ij = 1}, and the pair (K,G) represents a graph [26]. The network at the end
of time instant n is denoted by G(n+1), because it corresponds to the network at the beginning
of the next time instant. It is also useful to define the intermediate network G(n) in time instant
n, as described in Section IV this represents an intermediate step between G(n) and G(n+1).
We define the length ℓ(n)ij of a link (i, j) at time slot n as the number of slots since the link
has been formed, i.e., ℓ(n)ij , n−max{m ≤ n : g
(m)
ij = 0}. Since there is a reaction time between
when bacteria detect environmental cues and when they response to them [27], we define the
minimum link length ℓmin ≥ 1, meaning that a link (i, j) cannot be broken if ℓ(n)ij < ℓmin.
Given a network G (that may be either G(n) or G(n)), we define the set of i’s neighbors as
the set of bacteria to which bacterium i is linked to, Ni , {j ∈ K : gij = 1}, and we say that
1Notice that we abstract from geometric concepts. Our model can take into account the effects of a lower (higher) distance
by increasing (decreasing) the spread factor and decreasing (increasing) the probability that two bacteria meet.
8bacteria i and j are connected, denoted by i G←→ j, if (i, j) ∈ G or there are k bacteria such
that (i, i1), (i1, i2), . . . , (ik, j) ∈ G. We define the distance dij between two connected bacteria i
and j as the smallest number of links between i and j. We say that bacterium i is singleton if
(i, j) /∈ G, ∀ j 6= i, and we denote by KS the set of singleton bacteria.
(K,G) is a subgraph of (K,G) if K ⊆ K and G contains all the original links among the
bacteria in K. A component C of a graph is a subgraph in which any two bacteria are connected
to each other and which is connected to no additional bacteria in the original graph. We abuse
notation and write i ∈ C if bacterium i belongs to the set of bacteria defined by the component
C. The size |C| of a component C is the number of bacteria belonging to the component, whereas
the diameter DC , maxi,j∈C dij is the maximum distance between two bacteria i and j belonging
to C. Note that a singleton bacterium is itself a component with size 1 and diameter 0, and each
bacterium i ∈ K belongs to one and only one component.
IV. DYNAMIC NETWORK FORMATION GAME
In this section we formalize the interaction of the bacteria as a dynamic network formation
game [7], in which bacteria are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they select their actions to maximize
their immediate utilities. Moreover, we define the concepts of micro-colony and stable network,
which will be used in Section V to analyze how the network G(n) evolves in time.
A. Utility structure
Antibiotic tolerance develops very early in the formation of a biofilm, on the order of 1-3
hours after a community initiates [28]. Our prior study has attributed this to polysaccharides [5].
Hence, we assume that a bacterium i obtains a benefit, quantified by a utility function, whenever
it links to another bacterium j, because it exploits part of the resources produced but not used
by j. Given the network G(n) in time instant n, we define bacterium i’s utility as follows:
ui(t,G
(n)) ,


0 if i ∈ K(n)S∑
j↔i δ
dij−1f(tj)− c(ti) otherwise
(1)
f(tj) > 0 represents the benefit that bacterium i receives from bacterium j (having type tj) it is
linked with, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the spread factor, such that bacterium i can also benefit from a bacterium
j it is not directly linked with, but such a benefit decreases exponentially in their distance, and
c(ti) ≥ 0 is a cost to pay to be part of a non-singleton component. Since high type bacteria
9increase their resource production rate when linked to other bacteria and low type bacteria always
adopt a constant production rate, we consider f(H) > f(L) and c(H) > c(L) = 0.
The benefit that a bacterium i achieves when forming a link with a bacterium j is more
attractive if j is already connected to many bacteria. We refer to this effect as increasing
returns to link formation. This means that it is desirable and efficient for bacteria to be part
of components having large sizes. This is coherent with the experimental observation that
biofilm exhibit enhanced antibiotic tolerance [4]. However, to understand under which conditions
individual bacteria have an incentive to begin such a formation process, we need to formalize the
interaction among bacteria in each time slot as a game (Subsection IV-B), define the equilibrium
concepts of this interaction (Subsection IV-C), define stable states for the network (Subsection
IV-D), and study how the network can evolve (Section V).
B. The game
The interaction among bacteria is modeled as follows. At time slot 1, bacteria form an empty
network, i.e., G(1) = ∅. In a generic time slot n, the following events happen sequentially:
1. for each link (i, j) ∈ G(n) such that ℓ(n)ij ≥ ℓmin, bacteria i and j select whether to break
the link (i, j). Denote by a(n)ij ∈ {0, 1} and a
(n)
ji ∈ {0, 1} the choice of bacteria i and j,
respectively, where 1 (0) means that the bacterium wants to maintain (break) the link. Since
links are maintained bilaterally, the new network after this interaction is G(n) , {(i, j) :
g
(n)
ij = 1}, where g
(n)
ij , min{a
(n)
ij , a
(n)
ji };
2. with a certain probability one singleton bacteria i ∈ K(n)S approaches another bacteria j
(singleton or non singleton), this event is denoted by (i, j) ∈ E (n), and they decide whether
to form a link. Denote by s(n)ij ∈ {0, 1} and s
(n)
ji ∈ {0, 1} the choice of bacteria i and j,
respectively, where 1 (0) means that the bacterium wants to form (not to form) the link.
Since the link is formed bilaterally, the new network after this interaction is G(n+1) , G(n)
if g(n+1)ij , min{s
(n)
ij , s
(n)
ji } = 0, and G(n+1) , G
(n)⋃
{(i, j)} if g(n+1)ij = 1;
3. each bacterium i receives the utility ui(t,G(n+1)).
The meeting among bacteria in time step 2 is modeled as follows. With probability γ(|K(n)S |),
increasing in the number of singleton bacteria in G(n), one singleton bacterium i is picked
uniformly in K(n)S and is matched with one bacterium j, j 6= i. Notice that we do not allow
the formation of multiple links during the same time slot. An interpretation for this is that the
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considered time slot is so short that the probability that more than one pairs of bacteria meet is
negligible compared to the probability that only one pair of bacteria meets.
Since in our prior study we observed that areas rich of resources act as a signaling mechanism
that attracts bacteria toward them [6], we assume that the probability of being matched with a
bacterium j that has high connectivity (many links), and hence it is located in an area rich
of resources, is higher than the probability of being matched with a bacterium that has low
connectivity. Specifically, bacterium j is drawn from the distribution
pj =
h
(
|N (n)j |
)
∑
k 6=i h
(
|N (n)k |
) , j ∈ K , j 6= i ,
where the signaling mechanism h : N→ ℜ+ is a positive non-decreasing function.
C. Equilibrium concepts for complete and incomplete information settings
We consider the interaction among bacteria in two different scenarios. In the complete in-
formation setting bacteria know in advance the immediate utilities they will obtain by forming
links with other specific bacteria. This implies that, when bacterium i approaches bacterium j,
if j is singleton then i is able to recognize its type ( [29] shows that some bacteria have this
ability), whereas if j is not singleton then i is able to estimate the amount of resource produced
by the component j belongs to.We define the following equilibrium concept for the complete
information game.
Definition 1. An action profile a(n) =
(
{aij}(i,j)∈G(n):ℓ(n)ij ≥ℓmin
, {si˜j˜}(˜i,j˜)∈E(n)
)
in time instant n
is a myopic equilibrium in the complete information setting if and only if, ∀ i ∈ K : N (n)i 6= ∅,
∀ j ∈ N (n)i : ℓ
(n)
ij ≥ ℓmin, ∀ aˆij ∈ {0, 1}, and ∀ (˜i, j˜) ∈ E (n), the following conditions are satisfied
C1 ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : a(n)ij = 0}
)
≥ ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : aˆ(n)ij = 0}
)
,
C2 if ∃ j : a(n)ij = 0 then ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : a(n)ij = 0}
)
> ui
(
t,G(n)
)
,
C3 s(n)
i˜j˜
= 1 if and only if ui˜
(
t,G
(n)
∪ (˜i, j˜)
)
≥ ui˜(t,G
(n)
).
Condition C1 states that bacterium i selects the actions a(n)ij , j ∈ N
(n)
i , i.e., which links
to maintain, to maximize (a posteriori) the utility ui(t,G(n)) received at the end of the last
time slot. Condition C2 states that bacterium i prefers to maintain the links instead of breaking
them if the resulting utility is the same. Condition C3 states that bacterium i˜ that approaches
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bacterium j˜ selects the action s(n)
i˜j˜
, i.e., whether to form a new link with j˜, to maximize the
utility ui˜(t,G(n+1)) it will obtain at the end of the current slot.
In the incomplete information setting bacteria do not know the utilities they will obtain by
forming a link, because they are not able to detect the type of the other bacteria and the amount
of resource generated by the component the other bacteria belong to. In this case, we assume
that bacteria always form new links, i.e., s(n)
i˜j˜
= 1, ∀ (˜i, j˜) ∈ E (n), and that each bacterium i
selects the actions a(n)ij , j ∈ N
(n)
i , i.e., which links to maintain, to maximize (a posteriori) the
utility ui(t,G(n)) received at the end of the last time slot. Hence, the equilibrium concept for
the incomplete information game is defined as follows.
Definition 2. An action profile a(n) =
(
{aij}(i,j)∈G(n):ℓ(n)ij ≥ℓmin
)
in time instant n is a myopic
equilibrium in the incomplete information setting if and only if, ∀ i ∈ K : N (n)i 6= ∅, ∀ j ∈ N (n)i :
ℓ
(n)
ij ≥ ℓmin, ∀ aˆij ∈ {0, 1}, and ∀ (˜i, j˜) ∈ E (n), the following conditions are satisfied
C4 ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : a(n)ij = 0}
)
≥ ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : aˆ(n)ij = 0}
)
,
C5 if ∃ j : a(n)ij = 0 then ui
(
t,G(n) − {(i, j) : a(n)ij = 0}
)
> ui
(
t,G(n)
)
.
Proposition 1. In both complete and incomplete information settings, in each time instant n the
myopic equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof: A myopic equilibrium for the incomplete information setting can be obtained max-
imizing, for each bacterium i, the left side of condition C4 with respect to the actions a(n)ij ,
j ∈ N (n)i . Since the action space if finite, a solution exists. Moreover, each solution must satisfy
either a(n)ij = 0, ∀ j ∈ N
(n)
i , or a
(n)
ij = 1, ∀ j ∈ N
(n)
i . Indeed, maintaining all links is strictly
better than maintaining only a subset of them, because the cost to pay for a single link is equal
to the cost to pay for multiple links. Hence, there are only two possible solutions to maximize
the left side of condition C4. If they are equivalent in terms of i’s utility, condition C5 says to
take that one in which all links are maintained. Hence, the myopic equilibrium is unique for
the incomplete information setting. In addition to the above, in the complete information setting
condition C3 uniquely determines the action si˜j˜ in case bacterium i˜ approaches bacterium j˜.
Remark 1. The uniqueness of the equilibrium results from the fact that the best action of each
bacterium is independent from the actions of the other bacteria. For instance, if i has the incentive
to maintain (form) a link with j, its best action is a(n)ij = 1 (s(n)ij = 1), regardless of j’s action.
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Indeed, if j decides to maintain (form) the link then i achieves its goal, whereas if j decides not
to maintain (form) the link then i does not incur any additional cost with respect to the action
a
(n)
ij = 0 (s(n)ij = 0). This property implies that the resulting myopic equilibrium is robust to
changes in the actions of the other bacteria.
Remark 2. Proposition 1 implies that in each time slot n, given the network G(n) and the
parameters of the system, the decisions of the bacteria are unique. However, the evolution of the
network G(n) is not unique, because it depends both on these decisions and on the randomness
of the meetings among bacteria. Throughout the paper we implicitly assume that bacteria, in
each time slot n, adopt the unique myopic equilibrium, and we study the possible evolutions of
the network G(n) depending of the parameters of the system.
D. micro-colonies and stable networks
We say that the link (i, j) ∈ G(n) is stable if (i, j) ∈ G(m), ∀m > n, regardless of the realization
of the meetings among bacteria; whereas, if there is a positive probability that (i, j) /∈ G(m) for
some m > n, we say that the link is unstable.
Definition 3 (micro-colony). M is a micro-colony in time instant n if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied
A1) M is a subset of a component;
A2) ∀ i, j ∈M such that (i, j) ∈ G(n), we have that (i, j) is stable;
A3) ∀ i ∈M and j /∈M such that (i, j) ∈ G(n), we have that (i, j) is unstable;
A4) |M| ≥ 2.
A1 states that all the bacteria belonging to the micro-colony are connected to each others.
A2 is a stability condition, it states that the links among bacteria in the micro-colony are never
broken (hence, the size of a micro-colony can only grow in time), whereas by A3 a bacterium
belonging to the same component C of a micro-colony, but not belonging to the micro-colony,
may leave the component in the future. A4 excludes a singleton bacterium from being considered
a trivial form of micro-colony.
Exploiting the definition of micro-colony, we can now define a network stability concept.
Definition 4 (Stable-network). G(n) is a stable network if each bacterium belongs to a micro-
colony.
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As a consequence, if G(n) is a stable network then no link will ever be formed or broken and
each bacterium is linked to at least another bacterium (i.e., no bacterium moves freely along
the surface). A stable network can be interpreted as an important step toward the formation
of a biofilm. Indeed, if there are many bacteria that never link to micro-colonies then biofilm
formation is greatly reduced and the integrity of resulted biomass is severely degraded [30].
Let GS be the set of stable networks. We say that G(n) converges to a stable network if and
only if limn→+∞ G(n) exists and belongs to GS . We say that G(n) does not converge to a stable
network if and only if limn→+∞ G(n) does not exists, or it exists but it does not belong to GS .
Notice that the evolution of the network G(n) is a random process due to the randomness of
the meetings among bacteria. However, for some set of parameters it may be the case that G(n)
converges (does not converges) to a stable network with probability 1, regardless of the evolution
it follows. Formally, denoting by P [A] the probability of a generic event A, we say that G(n)
converges to a stable network with probability 1 if and only if P
[
limn→∞ G(n) ∈ GS
]
= 1, G(n)
does converges to a stable network with probability 1 if and only if P
[
limn→∞ G(n) /∈ GS
]
= 1.
Remark 3. “G(n) does not converge with probability 1” is not the complementary of “G(n)
converges with probability 1”; if fact, it is possible that the probability that a network converges
is positive but lower than 1. In these cases the convergence is determined by chance, by the
realization of the meeting among bacteria.
V. EVOLUTION TO A STABLE NETWORK
In this section we analyze the dynamic network formation game formally described in Section
IV, in both the complete and the incomplete information settings. As a main contribution of this
section we analytically derive the conditions on the system parameters under which the network
G(n) converges to a stable network with probability 1, under which G(n) does not converge to
a stable network with probability 1, and under which the convergence of G(n) is determined by
chance.
A. Complete information setting
In this subsection we analyze the complete information settings. In the first result, we char-
acterize the actions of low type bacteria, the action of high type bacteria when linked to some
other bacteria, and the actions of singleton high type bacteria that meet other singleton bacteria.
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Lemma 1. For each bacterium i and for each neighbor j ∈ N (n)i we have a(n)ij = 1.
For each singleton low type bacterium i˜ that approaches a singleton bacterium j˜ in time
instant n, we have s(n)
i˜j˜
= 1.
For each singleton high type bacterium i˜ that approaches a singleton low type bacterium j˜
in time instant n, we have s(n)
i˜j˜
= 1 if and only if f(L) ≥ c(H).
For each singleton high type bacterium i˜ that approaches a singleton high type bacterium j˜
in time instant n, we have s(n)
i˜j˜
= 1 if and only if f(H) ≥ c(H).
Proof: Given the utility structure (1), it is trivial that 1) because c(L) = 0, low type bacteria
always benefit from being linked to other bacteria, 2) a singleton high type bacterium increases
its utility if it links with a singleton low type bacterium if and only if f(L) ≥ c(H), and 3) a
singleton high type bacterium increases its utility if it links with a singleton high type bacterium
if and only if f(H) ≥ c(H). It remains to show that high type bacteria always want to maintain
a link. First, notice that a bacterium does not break a strict subset of its links because the cost
to pay for a single link is equal to the cost to pay for multiple links. Hence, a bacterium selects
either to break all links or to maintain all links. To conclude our proof we show that the utility
of each bacterium i is non decreasing in time, which implies that no bacterium has the incentive
to break all of its links returning to the initial situation. Let u(n)i the utility of i at time slot n.
Assume i is singleton at the beginning of the n-th slot, if it does not form a link during the n-th
slot then u(n+1)i = u
(n)
i , whereas if it forms a link then u
(n+1)
i ≥ u
(n)
i . Assume i is non singleton
at the beginning of the n-th slot, if no bacterium links to its component during the n-th slot then
u
(n+1)
i = u
(n)
i , whereas if a bacterium links to its component then u
(n+1)
i > u
(n)
i .
Lemma 1 shows that, in the complete information setting, all the links are stable. In fact,
when forming a link, a bacterium knows in advance it will increase its utility at the end of the
current time slot, and such increment can only increase in time because new bacteria can join
the component it belongs to. As a consequence, since bacteria do not break links and do not
leave the components they belong to, the concept of micro-colony coincides with the concept
of component with size at least 2. This is remarked in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. All components C of size at least 2 are micro-colonies.
Proof: Lemma 1 proves that all components are stable, hence all components of size at
least 2 satisfy A1-A4.
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Another implication of Lemma 1 is that singleton high type bacteria do not form links with
singleton bacteria if f(H) < c(H). In this case, high type bacteria must wait for low type
bacteria to form micro-colonies before starting to form links. One may wonder if there exists
a minimum size a micro-colony of low type bacteria must have before a high type bacterium
joins it. Proposition 3 answers positively to this question.
Proposition 3. Let M be a micro-colony. If f(H) < c(H) and |M| < Nth,1 , c(H)−f(L)δf(L) + 2
then M does not contain bacteria of high type.
Proof: We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume M is a micro-colony that contains
high type bacteria and |M| < Nth,1. Denote by i the first high type bacterium that linked to the
micro-colony, by n the time slot in which this happened, and by M the resulting micro-colony
after the link formation. Notice that the condition f(H) < c(H) excludes the possibility that
the micro-colony generated from a link between two high type bacteria, hence M is formed by
low type bacteria except for i. Then
ui
(
t,G(n)
)
≤ f(L) + (|M| − 2) δf(L)− c(H) ≤ f(L) + (|M| − 2) δf(L)− c(H) < 0,
where the first inequality is valid because i’s maximum utility is achieved when it links to a
bacterium that is directly linked with all the other bacteria, the second inequality is valid because
a micro-colony can only increase in size, and the third inequality is valid because |M| < Nth,1.
This contradicts the statement that i’s utility in non decreasing in time (see proof Lemma 1).
Remark 4. Nth,1−1 represents the minimum size a micro-colony of low type bacteria must have
such that a high type bacterium may have an incentive to join the micro-colony.
|M| ≥ Nth,1 − 1 is a necessary condition such that a high type bacterium joins the micro-
colony M. Now we investigate the existence of a sufficient condition, i.e., the existence of a
minimum size |M| that guarantees that high type bacteria always want to link to a bacterium
belonging to M. We consider only the case f(L) < c(H), because Lemma 1 guarantees that
for f(L) ≥ c(H) high type bacteria always want to form a link.
Proposition 4. If f(L) < c(H) and δ > c(H)−f(L)
c(H)
, then there exists Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ),
increasing in c(H) and decreasing in f(L) and δ, such that if a high type bacterium i˜ meets a
bacterium j˜ belonging to a micro-colony M with size |M| ≥ Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ), then s(n)i˜j˜ = 1.
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Proof: The utility i˜ obtains forming a link with j˜ is ui˜ ≥
∑|M|−1
j=0 δ
jf(L) − c(H) =
f(L)1−δ
|M|
1−δ
−c(H), where the first inequality is valid because i˜’s lowest utility is achieved when
all bacteria in M (except for i˜) have low type, when they are aligned, and j˜ is located in one
extreme of the line. Hence, ui˜ ≥ 0 (i.e., i˜ wants to form a link) if
f(L)
1− δ|M|
1− δ
≥ c(H) (2)
For |M| = 1 the inequality (2) is not satisfied because f(L) < c(H). Since the left side of
(2) increases in |M| and since for |M| → +∞ the inequality (2) holds strictly (because δ >
c(H)−f(L)
c(H)
), then there exists finite Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ) such that for |M| = Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ)
the inequality (2) holds with equality. Hence, for |M| ≥ Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ) the inequality 2
holds. Finally, since the left hand side of (2) increases in f(L) and δ, whereas the right hand
side of (2) increases in c(H), we have that Nth,2(f(L), c(H), δ) increases in c(H) and decreases
in f(L) and δ.
Remark 5. Nth,2 represents a critical size for a micro-colony M, above which high type bacteria
always want to link to a bacterium belonging to M.
Proposition 4 implies that high type bacteria cannot remain singleton forever if there exists a
micro-colony with size at least Nth,2, because they would eventually be attracted by the micro-
colony. This allows us to characterize the structure of a network that does not converge to a
stable network.
Theorem 1. If G(n) does not converge to a stable network, then G(n) converges to a network in
which all high type bacteria are singleton and each low type bacterium belongs to a micro-colony
with size lower than Nth,2.
Proof: We prove that all high type bacteria will be singleton by contradiction. Assume the
high type bacterium i belongs to a micro-colony in a generic time instant n and let (i, j) the first
link formed by i. Since a micro-colony can only grow in size, the utility a singleton high type
bacterium obtains by forming a link with j after time instant n is at least as high as the utility
i achieved when it formed the link with j, and as a consequence it is higher than the utility it
obtains being singleton. Hence, a high type bacterium cannot stay singleton forever because, if
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it does not join a micro-colony in the meantime, it will eventually meet j (such event happens
with positive probability in each time slot) and form a stable link with it. This contradicts the
fact that G(n) does not converge to a stable network.
A low type bacterium cannot stay singleton forever because, if it does not join a micro-colony
in the meantime, it will eventually meet another low type bacterium (such event happens with
positive probability in each time slot) and form a stable link with it. Finally, if a micro-colony
of low type bacteria has a size larger than Nth,2, then a high type bacterium will eventually
meet a bacterium belonging to the micro-colony and, because of Proposition 4, it will join the
micro-colony, contradicting the fact that all high type bacteria are singleton.
Now we analytically derive the conditions on the system parameters under which the network
G(n) converges to a stable network with probability 1, under which G(n) does not converge to
a stable network with probability 1, and under which the convergence of G(n) is determined by
chance.
Theorem 2. G(n) converges with probability 1 to a stable network if and only if either 1)
f(H) ≥ c(H), or 2) (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) and K(L) ≥ 2, or 3) K(H) = 0.
G(n) does not converge to a stable network with probability 1 if and only if f(H) < c(H),
K(L) < Nth,1 − 1, and K(H) > 0.
Proof: If f(H) ≥ c(H) then a high type bacterium cannot be singleton forever, because
it would eventually meet another high type bacterium (singleton or not) and form a stable link
with it. Hence, exploiting Theorem 1, we have f(H) ≥ c(H) implies that G(n) converges with
probability 1 to a stable network.
If (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) and K(L) ≥ 2 then a high type bacterium cannot be singleton
forever, because it would eventually meet a low type bacterium that is connected to at least
another low type bacterium and form a stable link with it. Hence, exploiting Theorem 1, we
have (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) implies G(n) converges with probability 1 to a stable network.
If K(H) = 0, then there are no high type bacteria and a network of low type bacteria always
converges with probability 1 to a stable network.
If f(H) < c(H), K(L) < Nth,1 − 1, and K(H) > 0, then the largest colony of low type
bacteria has a size lower than Nth,1 − 1. Hence, for Theorem 1 we have f(H) < c(H) and
K(L) < Nth,1 − 1 implies that G(n) does not converge to a stable network with probability 1.
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Finally, we prove that if f(H) < c(H), (1+δ)f(L) < c(H), K(L) ≥ Nth,1−1, and K(H) > 0,
then the probability that G(n) converges to a stable network is positive but lower than 1. On one
hand, assume that there exists a time instant n such that no low type bacterium is singleton and
the size of all micro-colonies is lower than Nth,1 − 1 (e.g., low type bacteria are connected in
couples). Notice that this event happens with positive probability. Proposition 3 guarantees that
no high type bacterium will ever link to a micro-colony, and the network does not converge
to a stable network. On the other hand, assume that there exists a time instant n such that at
least Nth,1 − 1 low type bacteria are connected together in a star topology. Notice that this
event happens with positive probability. A high type bacteria i will eventually meet the low type
bacteria located at the center of the star topology. Denote by ui the utility i would obtain if it
forms the link, we have ui ≥ f(L) + (Nth,1 − 2) δf(L)− c(H) = 0; hence, i will form a stable
link and Theorem 1 guarantees that G(n) converges to a stable network.
Remark 6. Theorem 2 implies that if f(H) < c(H), (1+δ)f(L) < c(H), and K(L) ≥ Nth,1−1,
then the convergence of G(n) is determined by chance.
Remark 7. If f(H) < c(H), low type bacteria play a fundamental role in the initial phase of
the micro-colonies formation process. In fact, in this case high type bacteria have an incentive
to link with other bacteria only after low type bacteria have formed micro-colonies of a large
enough size.
To understand why and how G(n) converges (does not converges) to a stable network, in the
following we describe some examples. If f(H) ≥ c(H) then two singleton high type bacteria
form a link when they meet, and this enables the formation of a micro-colony, as shown by
Fig. 5a. If (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) then a high type bacterium meeting a pair of low type bacteria
forms a link with them, and this enables the formation of a micro-colony, as shown by Fig.
5b. If f(H) < c(H), K(L) < Nth,1 and K(H) > 0, then the network cannot evolve in a
condition such that a high type bacterium has the incentive to form a link, as shown by Fig. 5c.
If f(H) < c(H), (1 + δ)f(L) < c(H), K(L) < Nth,1, and K(H) > 0, then it is possible that
enough low type bacteria connect together giving an incentive for high type bacteria to join the
micro-colony, but it is also possible that low type bacteria form many small size micro-colonies
that high type bacteria are not willing to join, both possibilities are shown in Fig. 5d.
Now we investigate the robustness of a stable network, that is, we wonder what happens
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Fig. 2: Possible evolutions of G(n) in the complete information setting. Black and white cells refer to low and high
type bacteria, respectively.
to a stable network if some links are broken regardless from the actions chosen by bacteria
(e.g., some bacteria can die). Does the network converges again to a stable network? Theorem 3
characterizes the conditions on the system parameters and on the number of broken links such
that the answer to the above question is positive.
Theorem 3. Let G(n) a stable network, and assume that L links are removed from it. If either
f(H) ≥ c(H) or (1+ δ)f(L) ≥ c(H), then G(n) converges again to a stable network, regardless
from the number L of removed links. If f(H) < c(H), (1+δ)f(L) < c(H), and K(L) ≥ Nth,1−1,
then G(n) converges again to a stable network if L ≤ K(H)
2(Nth,2+1)
.
Proof: If f(H) ≥ c(H) or (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H), then using the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 2 G(n) converges again to a stable network.
Now assume f(H) < c(H), (1+δ)f(L) < c(H), and K(L) < Nth,1. Denote by M the number
of micro-colonies in G(n) containing at least one high type bacterium, by K(m) the number of
high type bacteria belonging to the micro-colony m, and by L(m) the number of links broken in
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micro-colony m. We have
∑M
m=1K(m) = K(H) and
∑M
m=1 L(m) = L. If L(m) < 1 for some
m, then the micro-colony m is still present in the new network, and since m contains high type
bacteria, for Theorem 1, G(n) will converge again to a stable network. If K(m) ≥ Nth,2 +1 and
L(m) < ⌊ K(m)
Nth,2+1
⌋, where ⌊·⌋ is the largest integer smaller than the argument, then the micro-
colony m is divided into L(m) component, and at least one of these components has a size
equal to or larger than Nth,2 + 1. Hence, for Proposition 4, such component is a micro-colony,
and since it contains high type bacteria, for Theorem 1, G(n) will converge again to a stable
network. As a consequence, the minimum number of links to break such that there might be a
possibility that G(n) does not converge to a stable network is
Lmin ,
M∑
m=1
max{1,
⌊
K(m)
Nth,2 + 1
⌋
} >
M∑
m=1
K(m)
2(Nth,2 + 1)
=
K(H)
2(Nth,2 + 1)
,
where the inequality is valid because if K(m)
Nth,2+1
> 1 then max{1,
⌊
K(m)
Nth,2+1
⌋
} =
⌊
K(m)
Nth,2+1
⌋
>
K(m)
2(Nth,2+1)
, whereas if K(m)
2(Nth,2+1)
≤ 1 then max{1,
⌊
K(m)
Nth,2+1
⌋
} = 1 >
⌊
K(m)
2(Nth,2+1)
⌋
.
Remark 8. If the number of high type bacteria K(H) is large compare to the critical size Nth,2,
then the number of links to break to have a possibility that G(n) does not converge again to a
stable network is large.
B. Incomplete information setting
In this subsection we analyze the incomplete information settings.
In the first result, we shows that low type bacteria never break links, as a consequence a pair
of low type bacteria is a micro-colony. Also, we characterize the conditions under which a pair
of high and low type bacteria and a pair of high type bacteria are micro-colonies.
Lemma 2. For each low type bacterium i and for each neighbor j ∈ N (n)i we have a(n)ij = 1.
A pair of high and low type bacteria is a micro-colony if and only if f(L) ≥ c(H).
A pair of high type bacteria is a micro-colony if and only if f(H) ≥ c(H).
Proof: Because c(L) = 0, low type bacteria always benefit from being linked to other
bacteria, hence they always want to maintain a link. A high type bacterium i obtains a higher
utility being singleton than being paired with a low (high) type bacterium j if and only if
f(L) < c(H) (f(H) < c(H)). In this case, since there is a positive probability that no additional
bacterium forms a link with i or j before ℓ(n)ij > ℓmin, i may eventually break the link (i, j).
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Remark 9. In the incomplete information setting low type bacteria never break links but, differ-
ently from the complete information setting, high type bacteria can break links. As a consequence
not all the components are micro-colonies.
An implication of Lemma 2 is that singleton high type bacteria form unstable links with other
singleton bacteria if f(H) < c(H). In the next proposition we generalize such a results, and
show that all links between a high type bacterium and another bacterium are unstable if the size
of the component they belong to is below a certain threshold.
Proposition 5. Let M be a micro-colony. If f(H) < c(H) and |M| < Nth,3 , c(H)f(H) + 1 then
M does not contain bacteria of high type.
Proof: We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume M is a micro-colony that contains
high type bacteria and |M| < Nth,3. Denote by i the first high type bacterium that linked to the
micro-colony, by n the time slot in which this happened, and by M the resulting micro-colony
after the link formation. Notice that the condition f(H) < c(H) excludes the possibility that
the micro-colony generated from a link between two high type bacteria, hence M is formed by
low type bacteria except for i. Then
ui
(
t,G(n)
)
≤ (|M| − 1) f(L)− c(H) ≤ (|M| − 1) f(L)− c(H) < 0,
where the first inequality is valid because i’s maximum utility is achieved when all bacteria
in M are directly linked with i, the second inequality is valid because a micro-colony can only
increase in size, and the third inequality is valid because |M| < Nth,3. Since there is a positive
probability that no additional bacterium joins the micro-colony M before the lengths of i’s links
are larger than ℓmin, i may eventually leave M. This implies that M is not a micro-colony.
Remark 10. We have Nth,3 < Nth,1. Indeed, in the incomplete information setting a high type
bacterium i can form an unstable link with another high type bacterium, and before i can break
this link other high type bacteria can form direct links with i. Since i can be directly connected
with many high type bacteria before having the possibility to break the original link, in the
incomplete information setting it is possible to form smaller micro-colonies containing high
type bacteria than in the complete information setting. Finally, Nth,3 does not depends on δ
because of this possibility of creating many direct links.
Now we investigate the existence of a minimum size of a component C that guarantees that all
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the links are stable, i.e., such that C is a micro-colony. We consider only the case f(L) < c(H),
because Lemma 2 proves that for f(L) ≥ c(H) all links are stable.
Proposition 6. If f(L) < c(H) and δ > c(H)−f(L)
c(H)
, then there exists Nth,4(f(L), c(H), δ),
increasing in c(H) and decreasing in f(L) and δ, such that all the components C with size
|C| ≥ Nth,4(f(L), c(H), δ) + 1 are micro-colonies.
Proof: If f(L) < c(H) and δ > c(H)−f(L)
c(H)
then the utility of a high type bacterium i
belonging to a component C satisfies
ui
(
t,G(n)
)
≥
∑|C|−2
j=0 δ
jf(L)− c(H) = f(L)
1− δ|C|−1
1− δ
− c(H),
where the first inequality is valid because i’s lowest utility is achieved when all bacteria in
M (except for i) have low type, when they are aligned, and i is located in one extreme of the
line. Hence, ui
(
t,G(n)
)
≥ 0, meaning that i does not break any link, if
f(L)
1− δ|C|−1
1− δ
≥ c(H) (3)
For |C| = 2 inequality (3) is not satisfied because f(L) < c(H). For |C| → +∞ inequality (3)
holds strictly because δ > c(H)−f(L)
c(H)
. The left side of (3) increases in |C|, hence there exists
Nth,4(f(L), c(H), δ) such that for |C| ≥ Nth,4(f(L), c(H), δ) inequality 3 holds. Finally, since
the left hand side of (3) increases in f(L) and δ, whereas the right hand side of (3) increases
in c(H), we have that Nth,4(f(L), c(H), δ) increases in c(H) and decreases in f(L) and δ.
Remark 11. Nth,4 represents a critical size for a component C, above which high type bacteria
never leave the component.
Proposition 6 implies that high type bacteria cannot remain singleton forever if there exists
a micro-colony with size at least Nth,4 − ℓmin + 1, because it eventually happens that ℓmin − 1
bacteria link sequentially to the micro-colony, forming a micro-colony of size at least Nth,4 that
would eventually attract all the singleton bacteria. This allows us to characterize the structure
of a network that does not converge to a stable network.
Theorem 4. If G(n) does not converge to a stable network, then G(n) converges to a network in
which no high type bacterium belongs to a micro-colony and each low type bacterium belongs
to a micro-colony with size lower than Nth,4 − ℓmin + 1.
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Proof: We prove that no high type bacterium will be part of some micro-colonies by
contradiction. Assume the high type bacterium i belongs to a micro-colony in a generic time
instant n and let (i, j) the first link formed by i. Since a micro-colony can only grow in size, the
utility a singleton high type bacterium obtains by forming a link with j after time instant n is
at least as high as the utility i achieved when it formed the link with j, and as a consequence it
is higher than the utility it obtains being singleton. Hence, each singleton high type bacterium,
if it does not join a micro-colony in the meantime, will eventually meet j (such event happens
with positive probability in each time slot) and form a stable link with it. This contradicts the
fact that G(n) does not converge to a stable network. If a low type bacterium does not belong
to a micro-colony, it will eventually meet a micro-colony or another low type bacterium (such
event happens with positive probability in each time slot) and form a stable link. Finally, if a
micro-colony of low type bacteria has a size larger than Nth,4 − ℓmin, then it will eventually
happen that ℓmin high type bacteria link to that colony in subsequent time slots. Proposition 6
guarantees that the new component is a micro-colony, contradicting the fact that no high type
bacterium will be part of some micro-colonies.
Now we analytically derive the conditions on the system parameters under which the network
G(n) converges to a stable network with probability 1, under which G(n) does not converge to
a stable network with probability 1, and under which the convergence of G(n) is determined by
chance.
Theorem 5. Consider the case ℓmin = 1. Then G(n) converges with probability 1 to a stable
network if and only if either 1) f(H) ≥ c(H), or 2) (1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) and K(L) ≥ 2, or 3)
K(H) = 0; whereas G(n) does not converge to a stable network with probability 1 if and only
if f(H) < c(H), K(L) < Nth,1 − 1, and K(H) > 0.
Consider the case ℓmin ≥ 2. Then G(n) converges with probability 1 to a stable network if
K(H) ≥ Nth,4 − 2 and K ≥ Nth,4; whereas G(n) does not converge to a stable network with
probability 1 if f(H) < c(H), K < Nth,3, and K(H) > 0.
Proof: If ℓmin = 1, then the evolution of the network G(n) is as in the complete information
case, because a bacterium that forms a link can break it immediately (at the beginning of the
next slot), before other bacteria can join the component it belongs to. Hence, Theorem 2 holds.
Now consider the case ℓmin ≥ 2. Assume a high type i links with a low type j in time instant
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Fig. 3: Possible evolution of G(n) in the incomplete information setting if f(H)+δ(ℓmin−1)f(H)+δ(1+δ)f(L) ≥
c(H). In this case G(n) always converges to a stable network.
n. Even though this link is unstable, a new bacteria k can link with i in time instant m, such
that n < m < n + ℓmin. This means that i does not break the link in time instant n + ℓmin
(i.e., when ℓ(n)ij < ℓmin), because it is never convenient to break only parts of the links, and
the link (i, k) cannot be broken. If we iterate this reasoning, a component of whatever side can
be formed before a bacteria has the possibility to break its links. Hence, if K(H) ≥ Nth,4 − 2
and K ≥ Nth,4, high type bacteria will eventually belong to micro-colonies, because they can
eventually form a component of size at least Nth,4 and Proposition 6 guarantees that this is a
micro-colony. On the other hand, if there are high type bacteria in the system (i.e., K(H) > 0),
they cannot benefit from linking together (i.e., f(H) < c(H)), and the total number of bacteria
do not allow to form a component of size at least Nth,3, then Proposition 5 guarantees that G(n)
does not converge to a stable network with probability 1.
Remark 12. If the minimum link length is 1, then complete and incomplete information converge
under the same conditions.
Remark 13. If the minimum link length is larger than 1, then in the incomplete information
settings bacteria can form large size components before they have the possibility to break their
links, and this can enable the formation of a micro-colony. As a consequence, if the population
of high bacteria is larger than the critical size Nth,4, then G(n) always converges to a stable
network with probability 1.
Fig. 3 shows a possible evolution of a network G(n) in the incomplete information setting
with ℓmin = 3. Even though a high type bacterium i does not benefit from connecting with two
low type bacteria, there is the possibility that other high type bacteria connect to i’s component
before i leaves it, and this enables the formation of a micro-colony. Notice that the system
parameters in Fig. 3 are the same as in Fig. ??, but in the complete information setting G(n)
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does not converge to a stable network.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of a stable network.
Theorem 6. Let G(n) a stable network, and assume that L links are removed from it.
Consider the case ℓmin = 1. If f(H) + δ(ℓmin − 1)f(H) + δ(1 + δ)f(L) ≥ c(H) then
G(n) converges again to a stable network, independently from the number L of removed links.
Otherwise G(n) converges again to a stable network if L ≤ K(H)
2Nth,4
.
Consider the case ℓmin ≥ 2. If K(H) ≥ Nth,4 − 2 and K ≥ Nth,4, then G(n) converges again
to a stable network
Proof: The case ℓmin = 1 is proven as in Theorem 3. The case ℓmin ≥ 2 is proven using
the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 5.
Remark 14. If ℓmin ≥ 2 and the high type bacteria number K(H) is larger than the critical size
Nth,4, then G(n) converges again to a stable network, regardless from the number of broken links.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this Section we present several illustrative results aimed to understand the essential charac-
teristics of micro-colonies formation and their dependence on the key parameters of the system.
We consider the basic settings represented in Table I and we run several series of simulations.
In each series of simulations we vary the value of a single parameter, and for each value of the
parameter we run Nsym = 1000 simulations to average the results. A single simulation consists
of a maximum of Nslots = 104 time slots, if the network does not converge to a stable network
before achieving the maximum number of time slots then the network is considered unstable.
We first analyze the impact of the spread factor δ. In Fig. 4a we plot the empirical convergence
probability (top-left sub-figure), the average convergence time (top-right sub-figure), the average
size of the largest component (bottom-left sub-figure), and the average diameter of the largest
component (bottom-right sub-figure), for values of δ ranging from 0 to 1. For both the complete
and the incomplete information settings, if δ is very low then the network does not converge.
Indeed, low type bacteria form micro-colonies anyway, but the largest micro-colony C has a size
so small (about 10) and it is so spread (DC is about 5) that in the complete information setting
no high type bacteria has an incentive to join any micro-colonies, whereas in the incomplete
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TABLE I: Basic Simulation Settings.
Parameter description Symbol Value
Number of bacteria K 100
Ratio of high type bacteria ρH 0.7
Spread factor δ 0.8
Link cost for hight type bacteria cH 10
Benefit received from high type bacteria f(H) 2
Benefit received from low type bacteria f(L) 1
Minimum link length ℓmin 10
Signaling parameter m 1
Maximum number of iterations Nslots 104
Number of simulations for series Nsym 1000
information setting high type bacteria join temporarily some micro-colonies but then they even-
tually leave. The probability to converge to a stable network becomes positive for δ > 0.5 in
the incomplete information setting, and for δ > 0.8 in the complete information setting. The
convergence probability in the incomplete information setting is higher than the convergence
probability in the complete information case because in the incomplete information case high
type bacteria can join a micro-colony even if it is not currently beneficial for them, and this
allow the micro-colony to grow faster and attract other high type bacteria. Notice that, in this
case, for δ ≥ 0.9 the network converges to a stable network with probability 1.
Fig. 4b shows the impact of the minimum link length ℓmin. The results for the complete
information setting are not affected by ℓmin, indeed Lemma 1 proves that in this case bacteria
always form stable links, regardless of ℓmin. Unlike the complete information setting, the results
in the incomplete information case are strongly influence by ℓmin. On one hand, if ℓmin = 1 the
incomplete information case coincides with complete information case, indeed bacteria forming
non-beneficial links break the links immediately. On the other hand, if ℓmin is very large a high
type bacterium waits for a long time before deciding whether to break its links, and this enables
the formation of micro-colonies with high type bacteria.
Next we study the impact of the signaling mechanism. We consider a linear signaling mech-
anism h(x) = 1 + mx, and we vary the signaling parameter m from 0 to 20: m = 0 means
that the meetings are uniformly distributed, whereas the higher m the higher the probability that
a singleton bacterium is matched with a bacterium having many links. Fig. 5a shows that the
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Fig. 4: Convergence probability, convergence time, component size, and component diameter vs. (a) spread factor,
and (b) minimum link length.
signaling mechanism has a positive effect in the formation of the micro-colonies: if m is large,
then the probability that the network converges is large, the convergence time is low, and the
size of the component is large. Notice that the component diameter increases in m; however, this
is due to the fact that the component size increases as well. Since the component size increases
with a much faster rate than the component diameter, then we can conclude that a large m results
in large and compact micro-colonies.
Fig. 5b evaluates the impact of the ratio of high type bacteria, ρH . If ρH = 0 the population is
formed only by low type bacteria and the network converges to a stable network with probability
1. In the complete information, the higher ρH the lower the probability that the network converges
to a stable network, and as a consequence the lower the size of the largest component. In the
incomplete information the impact of ρH is more complex. In fact, in the incomplete information
settings two different factors are fundamentally important: the presence of low type bacteria that
form the first micro-colonies, and the presence of high type bacteria that link to these micro-
colonies and attract further bacteria. As a consequence of this trade-off, there exists an optimal
ratio of high type bacteria (ρH = 0.85) that maximizes the size of the largest component.
The trade-off between low and high type bacteria is even clearer in Fig. 6, that represents the
average utility that a bacterium obtains at the end of the simulation. On one hand, a population of
only low type bacteria always converges to a stable network, but the sizes of the micro-colonies
are small and no bacterium adopts a higher production rate which would result in a larger
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Fig. 5: Convergence probability, convergence time, component size, and component diameter vs. (a) signaling
parameter, and (b) ratio of high type bacteria.
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Fig. 6: Average utility for bacterium vs. ratio of high type bacteria.
benefit for all the bacteria belonging to the same micro-colony. On the other hand, a population
of only high type bacteria never converges to stable network, and the average utility is very low.
There exists an optimal ratio of high type bacteria (ρH = 0.87) such that the average utility
for bacterium is maximized. This implies that the long term benefit of a population of bacteria
is maximized when the population is heterogeneous: both low and high type bacteria play a
fundamental role in the formation of communities that exhibit enhanced antibiotic tolerance.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a parametrizable dynamic network formation game model to capture the dynamic
interaction among bacteria in the formation of micro-colonies. We rigorously characterized some
of the key properties of the network evolution depending on the parameters of the system, in both
the complete and the incomplete information settings. In particular, we derived the conditions
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on the system parameters under which the network G(n) converges to a stable network with
probability 1, under which G(n) does not converge to a stable network with probability 1, and
under which the convergence of G(n) is determined by chance. Importantly, our study does
not only characterize the properties of networks emerging in equilibrium, but it also provides
important insights on how the network dynamically evolves and on how the formation history
impacts the emerging networks in equilibrium. This analysis can be used to develop methods
to influence on-the-fly the evolution of the network, and such methods can be useful to design
biofilm therapeutic strategies.
As a continuation of this study, we plan to validate our model collecting experimental data.
Using an approach similar to the one adopted to generate Fig. 1, we will record the whole
history of formation of micro-colonies since the beginning of each experiment. We will use single
Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains, as well as a mixture of different strains. The experiments will
be performed in controlled environments to improve their repeatability, and will be repeated for
several times to obtain a statistically significant number of data. The collected data will be used
to tune the parameters of our model and to compare the real results with the results predicted
by our model.
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